吉鑫升andClaude Opus 4.8
3178b4c45e
清空浏览器缓存后(尤其 token 换登录)报「CSRF token missing」。根因: 反向代理把请求转发到带前缀的路径(如 /xxx/api/v1/auth/login/token), FastAPI 用 root_path 剥前缀做路由,但 Starlette 中间件跑在路由之前, 看到的仍是带前缀的 path,导致 CSRF 豁免名单与公开路径白名单(精确/前缀 匹配)全部失配。清缓存前靠 localStorage 残留 token 当 Bearer 绕过 CSRF, 清掉后裸奔才暴露。 - 新增 proxy_path.app_relative_path:匹配前按 root_path / X-Forwarded-Prefix 剥掉代理前缀(无前缀时 no-op)。 - csrf_middleware:should_check_csrf / is_auth_endpoint 改用应用相对路径; 补上漏收的 /api/v1/auth/login/token 豁免;新增「无 access_token 会话 cookie 则跳过 CSRF」兜底(无会话请求不存在可被跨站伪造利用的会话)。 - auth_middleware:公开路径判断改用应用相对路径,避免 /xxx/api/public/* 分享页被误判 401。 - langgraph_auth:无 access_token cookie 时跳过 CSRF,与网关链路一致。 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
130 lines
4.6 KiB
Python
130 lines
4.6 KiB
Python
"""LangGraph Server auth handler — shares JWT logic with Gateway.
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Loaded by LangGraph Server via langgraph.json ``auth.path``.
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Reuses the same ``decode_token`` / ``get_auth_config`` as Gateway,
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so both modes validate tokens with the same secret and rules.
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Two layers:
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1. @auth.authenticate — validates JWT cookie, extracts user_id,
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and enforces CSRF on state-changing methods (POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH)
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2. @auth.on — returns metadata filter so each user only sees own threads
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"""
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import secrets
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from langgraph_sdk import Auth
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from app.gateway.auth.disabled_mode import get_assumed_user_for_disabled_auth, is_auth_disabled
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from app.gateway.auth.errors import TokenError
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from app.gateway.auth.jwt import decode_token
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from app.gateway.deps import get_local_provider
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auth = Auth()
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# Methods that require CSRF validation (state-changing per RFC 7231).
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_CSRF_METHODS = frozenset({"POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "PATCH"})
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def _check_csrf(request) -> None:
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"""Enforce Double Submit Cookie CSRF check for state-changing requests.
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Mirrors Gateway's CSRFMiddleware logic so that LangGraph routes
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proxied directly by nginx have the same CSRF protection.
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"""
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method = getattr(request, "method", "") or ""
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if method.upper() not in _CSRF_METHODS:
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return
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authorization = request.headers.get("authorization", "").strip()
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if authorization.lower().startswith("bearer "):
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# CSRF protection is for cookie-auth browser flows.
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return
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# No cookie-based session → nothing for a cross-site forgery to ride, so
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# CSRF is moot. Enforcing it here would reject a freshly-loaded browser
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# (just cleared its cookies) before it can authenticate; such a request is
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# rejected as unauthenticated (401) below anyway.
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if not request.cookies.get("access_token"):
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return
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cookie_token = request.cookies.get("csrf_token")
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header_token = request.headers.get("x-csrf-token")
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if not cookie_token or not header_token:
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raise Auth.exceptions.HTTPException(
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status_code=403,
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detail="CSRF token missing. Include X-CSRF-Token header.",
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)
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if not secrets.compare_digest(cookie_token, header_token):
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raise Auth.exceptions.HTTPException(
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status_code=403,
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detail="CSRF token mismatch.",
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)
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@auth.authenticate
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async def authenticate(request):
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"""Validate the session cookie, decode JWT, and check token_version.
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Same validation chain as Gateway's get_current_user_from_request:
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cookie → decode JWT → DB lookup → token_version match
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Also enforces CSRF on state-changing methods.
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"""
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if is_auth_disabled():
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user = await get_assumed_user_for_disabled_auth()
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return str(user.id)
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# CSRF check before authentication so forged cross-site requests
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# are rejected early, even if the cookie carries a valid JWT.
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_check_csrf(request)
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token = request.cookies.get("access_token")
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if not token:
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authorization = request.headers.get("authorization", "").strip()
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scheme, _, bearer_token = authorization.partition(" ")
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if scheme.lower() == "bearer" and bearer_token.strip():
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token = bearer_token.strip()
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if not token:
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raise Auth.exceptions.HTTPException(
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status_code=401,
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detail="Not authenticated",
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)
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payload = decode_token(token)
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if isinstance(payload, TokenError):
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raise Auth.exceptions.HTTPException(
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status_code=401,
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detail="Invalid token",
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)
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user = await get_local_provider().get_user(payload.sub)
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if user is None:
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raise Auth.exceptions.HTTPException(
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status_code=401,
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detail="User not found",
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)
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if user.token_version != payload.ver:
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raise Auth.exceptions.HTTPException(
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status_code=401,
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detail="Token revoked (password changed)",
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)
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return payload.sub
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@auth.on
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async def add_owner_filter(ctx: Auth.types.AuthContext, value: dict):
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"""Inject user_id metadata on writes; filter by user_id on reads.
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Gateway stores thread ownership as ``metadata.user_id``.
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This handler ensures LangGraph Server enforces the same isolation.
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"""
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# On create/update: stamp user_id into metadata
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metadata = value.setdefault("metadata", {})
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metadata["user_id"] = ctx.user.identity
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# Return filter dict — LangGraph applies it to search/read/delete
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return {"user_id": ctx.user.identity}
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