sync update from LAN repo (source master @ ca48c4ec)

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gozeros committed 2026-11-05 10:53:54 +08:00
1 parent 8bc8b0e082
commit ea9dcff9c0
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+107866 -14011

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@@ -1,26 +1,26 @@
"""Global authentication middleware — fail-closed safety net.
Rejects unauthenticated requests to non-public paths with 401. When a
request passes the cookie check, resolves the JWT payload to a real
``User`` object and stamps it into both ``request.state.user`` and the
``deerflow.runtime.user_context`` contextvar so that repository-layer
owner filtering works automatically via the sentinel pattern.
Fine-grained permission checks remain in authz.py decorators.
"""
"""Global authentication middleware — fail-closed safety net.
Rejects unauthenticated requests to non-public paths with 401. When a
request passes the cookie check, resolves the JWT payload to a real
``User`` object and stamps it into both ``request.state.user`` and the
``deerflow.runtime.user_context`` contextvar so that repository-layer
owner filtering works automatically via the sentinel pattern.
Fine-grained permission checks remain in authz.py decorators.
"""
import hashlib
import hmac
import re
from collections.abc import Callable
from fastapi import HTTPException, Request, Response
from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
from starlette.responses import JSONResponse
from starlette.types import ASGIApp
from app.gateway.auth.disabled_mode import get_assumed_user_for_disabled_auth, is_auth_disabled
from app.gateway.auth.errors import AuthErrorCode, AuthErrorResponse
import re
from collections.abc import Callable
from fastapi import HTTPException, Request, Response
from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
from starlette.responses import JSONResponse
from starlette.types import ASGIApp
from app.gateway.auth.disabled_mode import get_assumed_user_for_disabled_auth, is_auth_disabled
from app.gateway.auth.errors import AuthErrorCode, AuthErrorResponse
from app.gateway.authz import _ALL_PERMISSIONS, AuthContext
from app.gateway.internal_auth import INTERNAL_AUTH_HEADER_NAME, get_internal_user, is_valid_internal_auth_token
from app.gateway.proxy_path import app_relative_path
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ from app.gateway.weknora_embed import (
is_weknora_embed_proxy_path,
)
from deerflow.runtime.user_context import reset_current_user, set_current_user
# Health probes are deliberately public, including the LangGraph-compatible
# gateway alias used by some deployments. Keep these as exact paths: health
# checks must bypass authentication, but similarly named application routes
@@ -44,31 +44,32 @@ PUBLIC_HEALTH_PATHS: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
)
# Path prefixes that never require authentication.
#
# ``/api/public/`` is a namespace reserved for intentionally world-readable,
# read-only endpoints (e.g. public conversation share snapshots). Only mount
# safe read-only routes under it — everything there bypasses auth entirely.
#
# ``/api/public/`` is a namespace reserved for intentionally world-readable,
# read-only endpoints (e.g. public conversation share snapshots). Only mount
# safe read-only routes under it — everything there bypasses auth entirely.
_PUBLIC_PATH_PREFIXES: tuple[str, ...] = (
"/docs",
"/redoc",
"/openapi.json",
"/api/public/",
# 开放问答接口:无需登录即可指定模型 + 智能体做问答(见 routers/open_chat.py)。
# 以 "default" 用户桶运行,只暴露受控的问答能力。
"/api/open/",
)
# Exact auth paths that are public (login/register/status check).
# /api/v1/auth/me, /api/v1/auth/change-password etc. are NOT public.
"/redoc",
"/openapi.json",
"/api/public/",
# 开放问答接口:无需登录即可指定模型 + 智能体做问答(见 routers/open_chat.py)。
# 以 "default" 用户桶运行,只暴露受控的问答能力。
"/api/open/",
)
# Exact auth paths that are public (login/register/status check).
# /api/v1/auth/me, /api/v1/auth/change-password etc. are NOT public.
_PUBLIC_EXACT_PATHS: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
{
*PUBLIC_HEALTH_PATHS,
"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
"/api/v1/auth/options",
"/api/v1/auth/login/username",
"/api/v1/auth/login/token",
"/api/v1/auth/register",
"/api/v1/auth/logout",
"/api/v1/auth/login/username",
"/api/v1/auth/login/token",
"/api/v1/auth/service/exchange",
"/api/v1/auth/register",
"/api/v1/auth/logout",
"/api/v1/auth/setup-status",
"/api/v1/auth/initialize",
# Anonymous vector search over published local Wiki indexes.
@@ -99,16 +100,54 @@ def _authorize_external_llmwiki(request: Request) -> JSONResponse | None:
config = get_app_config().llmwiki.local_wiki_index.external_api
supplied = request.headers.get("X-API-Key", "")
valid = bool(config.enabled and supplied) and any(
hmac.compare_digest(supplied, candidate)
for candidate in (config.api_key, config.previous_api_key)
if candidate
)
valid = bool(config.enabled and supplied) and any(hmac.compare_digest(supplied, candidate) for candidate in (config.api_key, config.previous_api_key) if candidate)
if not valid:
return JSONResponse(status_code=401, content={"detail": "Invalid API key"})
request.state.external_api_key_fingerprint = hashlib.sha256(
supplied.encode("utf-8")
).hexdigest()[:8]
request.state.external_api_key_fingerprint = hashlib.sha256(supplied.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:8]
return None
def _is_task_deeplink_external_write(request: Request, path: str) -> bool:
"""Whether this is the credential-free integration write path."""
return request.method.upper() == "PUT" and path.startswith("/api/task-deeplink-details/")
# 力量态势的任务详情由既有定时技能直接读写。该类技能无法及时统一
# 迁移到新登录鉴权,产品侧决定暂时将「当前详情」读写接口作为开放的
# 内网集成接口。严格限制为一个 task id 段与 detail 终点,不能因为
# 此豁免而放开 versions、其他力量态势接口或整个 /api/force-situation 前缀。
_FORCE_SITUATION_DETAIL_RE = re.compile(
r"^/api/force-situation/tasks/[^/]+/(?:detail|versions)$"
)
def _is_force_situation_detail_external_request(method: str, path: str) -> bool:
"""Whether this is the credential-free force-situation detail read/write API."""
normalized = path.rstrip("/")
if not _FORCE_SITUATION_DETAIL_RE.fullmatch(normalized):
return False
return method.upper() == "GET" or (
method.upper() == "PUT" and normalized.endswith("/detail")
)
def _authorize_task_deeplink_external_write(request: Request) -> JSONResponse | None:
"""Mark the external b5-1 task-detail write; no credential is required.
The embedding system writes task snapshots server-to-server before the
user's browser is involved, so by product decision this PUT is an open
endpoint: any caller may store a snapshot without a login session or an
integration key. A supplied ``X-Integration-Key`` header is accepted but
only recorded (fingerprint) for audit; it is never validated. Reads still
follow the normal login path.
"""
request.state.task_deeplink_external_writer = True
supplied = request.headers.get("X-Integration-Key", "")
if supplied:
request.state.task_deeplink_external_key_fingerprint = hashlib.sha256(supplied.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:8]
return None
@@ -126,126 +165,175 @@ def _is_weknora_embed_proxy_request(request: Request) -> bool:
if not is_weknora_embed_proxy_path(path):
return False
return has_valid_weknora_embed_cookie(request.cookies.get(WEKNORA_EMBED_COOKIE))
# 「发起问答」的 run 创建接口(会真正调用大模型):
# POST /api/threads/{id}/runs[/stream|/wait]
# POST /api/runs/{stream|wait}
# (含 nginx 未改写到的 /api/langgraph/... 前缀,双保险)
# 只匹配这些「提交问答」的 POST,不碰 GET 列表 / join / cancel / feedback 等,
# 这样登录白名单开启后,未放行用户(凭旧 token)无法再用接口问答,但普通浏览不受影响。
_QA_RUN_RE = re.compile(r"^/api/(?:langgraph/)?(?:threads/[^/]+/)?runs(?:/stream|/wait)?$")
def _is_qa_run_request(method: str, path: str) -> bool:
"""True for an authenticated「发起问答」run-creation request (see ``_QA_RUN_RE``)."""
return method.upper() == "POST" and bool(_QA_RUN_RE.match(path.rstrip("/")))
class AuthMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
"""Strict auth gate: reject requests without a valid session.
Two-stage check for non-public paths:
1. Cookie presence — return 401 NOT_AUTHENTICATED if missing
2. JWT validation via ``get_optional_user_from_request`` — return 401
TOKEN_INVALID if the token is absent, malformed, expired, or the
signed user does not exist / is stale
On success, stamps ``request.state.user`` and the
``deerflow.runtime.user_context`` contextvar so that repository-layer
owner filters work downstream without every route needing a
``@require_auth`` decorator. Routes that need per-resource
authorization (e.g. "user A cannot read user B's thread by guessing
the URL") should additionally use ``@require_permission(...,
owner_check=True)`` for explicit enforcement — but authentication
itself is fully handled here.
"""
def __init__(self, app: ASGIApp) -> None:
super().__init__(app)
async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next: Callable) -> Response:
# 「发起问答」的 run 创建接口(会真正调用大模型):
# POST /api/threads/{id}/runs[/stream|/wait]
# POST /api/runs/{stream|wait}
# (含 nginx 未改写到的 /api/langgraph/... 前缀,双保险)
# 只匹配这些「提交问答」的 POST,不碰 GET 列表 / join / cancel / feedback 等,
# 这样登录白名单开启后,未放行用户(凭旧 token)无法再用接口问答,但普通浏览不受影响。
_QA_RUN_RE = re.compile(r"^/api/(?:langgraph/)?(?:threads/[^/]+/)?runs(?:/stream|/wait)?$")
def _is_qa_run_request(method: str, path: str) -> bool:
"""True for an authenticated「发起问答」run-creation request (see ``_QA_RUN_RE``)."""
return method.upper() == "POST" and bool(_QA_RUN_RE.match(path.rstrip("/")))
class AuthMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
"""Strict auth gate: reject requests without a valid session.
Two-stage check for non-public paths:
1. Cookie presence — return 401 NOT_AUTHENTICATED if missing
2. JWT validation via ``get_optional_user_from_request`` — return 401
TOKEN_INVALID if the token is absent, malformed, expired, or the
signed user does not exist / is stale
On success, stamps ``request.state.user`` and the
``deerflow.runtime.user_context`` contextvar so that repository-layer
owner filters work downstream without every route needing a
``@require_auth`` decorator. Routes that need per-resource
authorization (e.g. "user A cannot read user B's thread by guessing
the URL") should additionally use ``@require_permission(...,
owner_check=True)`` for explicit enforcement — but authentication
itself is fully handled here.
"""
def __init__(self, app: ASGIApp) -> None:
super().__init__(app)
async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next: Callable) -> Response:
# Match the application-relative path so a reverse-proxy prefix
# (e.g. /xxx/api/public/...) does not defeat the public whitelist.
relative_path = app_relative_path(request)
if _is_external_llmwiki(relative_path):
rejected = _authorize_external_llmwiki(request)
return rejected if rejected is not None else await call_next(request)
if _is_task_deeplink_external_write(request, relative_path):
rejected = _authorize_task_deeplink_external_write(request)
if rejected is not None:
return rejected
if getattr(request.state, "task_deeplink_external_writer", False):
return await call_next(request)
if _is_force_situation_detail_external_request(request.method, relative_path):
return await call_next(request)
if _is_public(relative_path):
return await call_next(request)
if _is_weknora_embed_proxy_request(request):
return await call_next(request)
if is_auth_disabled():
user = await get_assumed_user_for_disabled_auth()
request.state.user = user
request.state.auth = AuthContext(user=user, permissions=_ALL_PERMISSIONS)
token = set_current_user(user)
try:
return await call_next(request)
finally:
reset_current_user(token)
internal_user = None
if is_valid_internal_auth_token(request.headers.get(INTERNAL_AUTH_HEADER_NAME)):
internal_user = get_internal_user()
# Non-public path: require session cookie
from app.gateway.deps import get_request_access_token
if internal_user is None and not get_request_access_token(request):
return JSONResponse(
status_code=401,
content={
"detail": AuthErrorResponse(
code=AuthErrorCode.NOT_AUTHENTICATED,
message="Authentication required",
).model_dump()
},
)
# Strict JWT validation: reject junk/expired tokens with 401
# right here instead of silently passing through. This closes
# the "junk cookie bypass" gap (AUTH_TEST_PLAN test 7.5.8):
# without this, non-isolation routes like /api/models would
# accept any cookie-shaped string as authentication.
#
# We call the *strict* resolver so that fine-grained error
# codes (token_expired, token_invalid, user_not_found, …)
# propagate from AuthErrorCode, not get flattened into one
# generic code. BaseHTTPMiddleware doesn't let HTTPException
# bubble up, so we catch and render it as JSONResponse here.
from app.gateway.deps import get_current_user_from_request
if internal_user is not None:
user = internal_user
else:
try:
user = await get_current_user_from_request(request)
except HTTPException as exc:
return JSONResponse(status_code=exc.status_code, content={"detail": exc.detail})
# Stamp both request.state.user (for the contextvar pattern)
# and request.state.auth (so @require_permission's "auth is
# None" branch short-circuits instead of running the entire
# JWT-decode + DB-lookup pipeline a second time per request).
request.state.user = user
request.state.auth = AuthContext(user=user, permissions=_ALL_PERMISSIONS)
# 登录白名单:开关开启时,未放行用户(非 admin)不仅被拦在登录外,连「接口
# 问答」也封掉——已拿到 token 的未放行用户用旧会话直接调问答接口同样被拒。
# 仅作用于「发起问答」的 run 接口;内部/渠道调用(internal_user)不受限。
if internal_user is None and _is_qa_run_request(request.method, app_relative_path(request)):
from app.gateway.routers.auth import enforce_user_approved
try:
enforce_user_approved(user)
except HTTPException as exc:
return JSONResponse(status_code=exc.status_code, content={"detail": exc.detail})
token = set_current_user(user)
try:
return await call_next(request)
finally:
reset_current_user(token)
user = await get_assumed_user_for_disabled_auth()
request.state.user = user
request.state.auth = AuthContext(user=user, permissions=_ALL_PERMISSIONS)
token = set_current_user(user)
try:
return await call_next(request)
finally:
reset_current_user(token)
internal_user = None
if is_valid_internal_auth_token(request.headers.get(INTERNAL_AUTH_HEADER_NAME)):
internal_user = get_internal_user()
# Non-public path: require session cookie
from app.gateway.deps import get_request_access_token
if internal_user is None and not get_request_access_token(request):
return JSONResponse(
status_code=401,
content={
"detail": AuthErrorResponse(
code=AuthErrorCode.NOT_AUTHENTICATED,
message="Authentication required",
).model_dump()
},
)
# Strict JWT validation: reject junk/expired tokens with 401
# right here instead of silently passing through. This closes
# the "junk cookie bypass" gap (AUTH_TEST_PLAN test 7.5.8):
# without this, non-isolation routes like /api/models would
# accept any cookie-shaped string as authentication.
#
# We call the *strict* resolver so that fine-grained error
# codes (token_expired, token_invalid, user_not_found, …)
# propagate from AuthErrorCode, not get flattened into one
# generic code. BaseHTTPMiddleware doesn't let HTTPException
# bubble up, so we catch and render it as JSONResponse here.
from app.gateway.deps import get_current_user_from_request
if internal_user is not None:
user = internal_user
else:
try:
user = await get_current_user_from_request(request)
except HTTPException as exc:
return JSONResponse(status_code=exc.status_code, content={"detail": exc.detail})
if internal_user is None:
from app.gateway.auth import TokenError, decode_token
payload = decode_token(get_request_access_token(request) or "")
if not isinstance(payload, TokenError) and payload.auth_method == "service":
method = request.method.upper()
path = app_relative_path(request).rstrip("/")
allowed = _is_service_scope_request(
payload.scope,
method,
path,
all_requested=request.query_params.get("all", "").lower() in {"true", "1", "yes", "on"},
)
if not allowed:
return JSONResponse(status_code=403, content={"detail": "Service token is not permitted for this endpoint"})
# Stamp both request.state.user (for the contextvar pattern)
# and request.state.auth (so @require_permission's "auth is
# None" branch short-circuits instead of running the entire
# JWT-decode + DB-lookup pipeline a second time per request).
request.state.user = user
request.state.auth = AuthContext(user=user, permissions=_ALL_PERMISSIONS)
# 登录白名单:开关开启时,未放行用户(非 admin)不仅被拦在登录外,连「接口
# 问答」也封掉——已拿到 token 的未放行用户用旧会话直接调问答接口同样被拒。
# 仅作用于「发起问答」的 run 接口;内部/渠道调用(internal_user)不受限。
if internal_user is None and _is_qa_run_request(request.method, app_relative_path(request)):
from app.gateway.routers.auth import enforce_user_approved
try:
enforce_user_approved(user)
except HTTPException as exc:
return JSONResponse(status_code=exc.status_code, content={"detail": exc.detail})
token = set_current_user(user)
try:
return await call_next(request)
finally:
reset_current_user(token)
_LLMWIKI_SYNC_COLLECTION = "/api/llmwiki/knowledge-bases"
_LLMWIKI_SYNC_ITEM_RE = re.compile(r"^/api/llmwiki/knowledge-bases/[^/]+$")
_LLMWIKI_SYNC_DOCUMENT_RE = re.compile(r"^/api/llmwiki/knowledge-bases/[^/]+/documents(?:/[^/]+)?$")
_LLMWIKI_SYNC_MANUAL_RE = re.compile(r"^/api/llmwiki/knowledge-bases/[^/]+/documents/manual$")
def _is_llmwiki_sync_request(method: str, path: str) -> bool:
if path == _LLMWIKI_SYNC_COLLECTION:
return method in {"GET", "POST"}
if _LLMWIKI_SYNC_ITEM_RE.fullmatch(path):
return method in {"GET", "PATCH", "DELETE"}
if _LLMWIKI_SYNC_MANUAL_RE.fullmatch(path):
return method == "POST"
if _LLMWIKI_SYNC_DOCUMENT_RE.fullmatch(path):
return method in {"GET", "POST", "DELETE"}
return False
def _is_service_scope_request(scopes: list[str], method: str, path: str, *, all_requested: bool = False) -> bool:
return (
("llmwiki:sync" in scopes and _is_llmwiki_sync_request(method, path))
or ("recommended-questions:read" in scopes and method == "GET" and path == "/api/recommended-questions" and not all_requested)
)