fix: harden WeKnora knowledge permissions and details

This commit is contained in:
吉鑫升 committed 2026-08-12 15:45:28 +08:00
1 parent e0c09f6704
commit b4d076a2d4
20 files changed
+1713 -298

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@@ -19,10 +19,15 @@ from starlette.types import ASGIApp
from app.gateway.auth.disabled_mode import get_assumed_user_for_disabled_auth, is_auth_disabled
from app.gateway.auth.errors import AuthErrorCode, AuthErrorResponse
from app.gateway.authz import _ALL_PERMISSIONS, AuthContext
from app.gateway.internal_auth import INTERNAL_AUTH_HEADER_NAME, get_internal_user, is_valid_internal_auth_token
from app.gateway.proxy_path import app_relative_path
from deerflow.runtime.user_context import reset_current_user, set_current_user
from app.gateway.authz import _ALL_PERMISSIONS, AuthContext
from app.gateway.internal_auth import INTERNAL_AUTH_HEADER_NAME, get_internal_user, is_valid_internal_auth_token
from app.gateway.proxy_path import app_relative_path
from app.gateway.weknora_embed import (
WEKNORA_EMBED_COOKIE,
has_valid_weknora_embed_cookie,
is_weknora_embed_proxy_path,
)
from deerflow.runtime.user_context import reset_current_user, set_current_user
# Health probes are deliberately public, including the LangGraph-compatible
# gateway alias used by some deployments. Keep these as exact paths: health
@@ -65,15 +70,31 @@ _PUBLIC_EXACT_PATHS: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
"/api/v1/auth/initialize",
# 并行多智能体面板专用的「绕过常规登录」取 token 端点(内网部署限制了标准登录时用)。
"/api/parallel-agents/auth/token",
}
)
def _is_public(path: str) -> bool:
stripped = path.rstrip("/")
if stripped in _PUBLIC_EXACT_PATHS:
return True
return any(path.startswith(prefix) for prefix in _PUBLIC_PATH_PREFIXES)
}
)
def _is_public(path: str) -> bool:
stripped = path.rstrip("/")
if stripped in _PUBLIC_EXACT_PATHS:
return True
return any(path.startswith(prefix) for prefix in _PUBLIC_PATH_PREFIXES)
def _is_weknora_embed_proxy_request(request: Request) -> bool:
"""Let the WeKnora embed proxy verify its own signed iframe cookie.
The embedded WeKnora frontend loads root-relative routes (``/platform``,
``/assets``, ``/locales`` and ``/api/v1/*``). Those requests do not carry
DeerFlow's Authorization header, but the iframe bootstrap has already set a
short-lived signed cookie that the proxy router validates against the
requested knowledge base.
"""
path = app_relative_path(request)
if not is_weknora_embed_proxy_path(path):
return False
return has_valid_weknora_embed_cookie(request.cookies.get(WEKNORA_EMBED_COOKIE))
# 「发起问答」的 run 创建接口(会真正调用大模型):
@@ -114,12 +135,14 @@ class AuthMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
super().__init__(app)
async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next: Callable) -> Response:
# Match the application-relative path so a reverse-proxy prefix
# (e.g. /xxx/api/public/...) does not defeat the public whitelist.
if _is_public(app_relative_path(request)):
return await call_next(request)
if is_auth_disabled():
# Match the application-relative path so a reverse-proxy prefix
# (e.g. /xxx/api/public/...) does not defeat the public whitelist.
if _is_public(app_relative_path(request)):
return await call_next(request)
if _is_weknora_embed_proxy_request(request):
return await call_next(request)
if is_auth_disabled():
user = await get_assumed_user_for_disabled_auth()
request.state.user = user
request.state.auth = AuthContext(user=user, permissions=_ALL_PERMISSIONS)