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"""Authentication endpoints."""
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import logging
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import os
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import time
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from ipaddress import ip_address, ip_network
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from typing import Literal
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from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Request, Response, status
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from fastapi.security import OAuth2PasswordRequestForm
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from pydantic import BaseModel, EmailStr, Field, field_validator
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from app.gateway.auth import (
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UserResponse,
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create_access_token,
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)
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from app.gateway.auth.config import get_auth_config
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from app.gateway.auth.errors import AuthErrorCode, AuthErrorResponse
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from app.gateway.csrf_middleware import is_secure_request
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from app.gateway.deps import get_current_user_from_request, get_local_provider
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/v1/auth", tags=["auth"])
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# ── Request/Response Models ──────────────────────────────────────────────
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class LoginResponse(BaseModel):
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"""Response model for login — token only lives in HttpOnly cookie."""
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expires_in: int # seconds
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needs_setup: bool = False
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# Top common-password blocklist. Drawn from the public SecLists "10k worst
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# passwords" set, lowercased + length>=8 only (shorter ones already fail
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# the min_length check). Kept tight on purpose: this is the **lower bound**
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# defense, not a full HIBP / passlib check, and runs in-process per request.
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_COMMON_PASSWORDS: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
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{
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"password",
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"password1",
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"password12",
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"password123",
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"password1234",
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"12345678",
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"123456789",
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"1234567890",
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"qwerty12",
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"qwertyui",
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"qwerty123",
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"abc12345",
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"abcd1234",
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"iloveyou",
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"letmein1",
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"welcome1",
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"welcome123",
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"admin123",
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"administrator",
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"passw0rd",
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"p@ssw0rd",
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"monkey12",
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"trustno1",
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"sunshine",
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"princess",
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"football",
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"baseball",
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"superman",
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"batman123",
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"starwars",
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"dragon123",
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"master123",
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"shadow12",
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"michael1",
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"jennifer",
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"computer",
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}
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)
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def _password_is_common(password: str) -> bool:
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"""Case-insensitive blocklist check.
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Lowercases the input so trivial mutations like ``Password`` /
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``PASSWORD`` are also rejected. Does not normalize digit substitutions
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(``p@ssw0rd`` is included as a literal entry instead) — keeping the
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rule cheap and predictable.
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"""
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return password.lower() in _COMMON_PASSWORDS
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def _validate_strong_password(value: str) -> str:
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"""Pydantic field-validator body shared by Register + ChangePassword.
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Constraint = function, not type-level mixin. The two request models
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have no "is-a" relationship; they only share the password-strength
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rule. Lifting it into a free function lets each model bind it via
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``@field_validator(field_name)`` without inheritance gymnastics.
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"""
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if _password_is_common(value):
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raise ValueError("Password is too common; choose a stronger password.")
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return value
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class RegisterRequest(BaseModel):
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"""Request model for user registration."""
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email: EmailStr
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password: str = Field(..., min_length=8)
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_strong_password = field_validator("password")(classmethod(lambda cls, v: _validate_strong_password(v)))
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class UsernameLoginRequest(BaseModel):
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"""Request model for passwordless username login.
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Behavior:
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- Existing user: direct login without password
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- Missing user: auto-register and login without password
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"""
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username: str = Field(..., min_length=1, max_length=128)
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class UsernameLoginResponse(BaseModel):
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"""Response model for passwordless username login.
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Returns the access token directly in the body so non-browser clients
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can use it as a Bearer credential, while a session cookie is still set
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for browser-based callers.
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"""
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access_token: str
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token_type: str = "bearer"
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expires_in: int
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user_id: str
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email: str
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system_role: Literal["admin", "user"] = "user"
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needs_setup: bool = False
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created: bool = Field(default=False, description="True when the user was auto-registered by this call")
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class ChangePasswordRequest(BaseModel):
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"""Request model for password change (also handles setup flow)."""
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current_password: str
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new_password: str = Field(..., min_length=8)
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new_email: EmailStr | None = None
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_strong_password = field_validator("new_password")(classmethod(lambda cls, v: _validate_strong_password(v)))
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class MessageResponse(BaseModel):
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"""Generic message response."""
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message: str
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# ── Helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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def _username_to_email(username: str) -> str:
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"""Map a frontend username to a valid email used by user storage.
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- If username already looks like an email (`contains @`), use it directly.
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- Otherwise generate `<normalized-username>@<domain>`.
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"""
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raw = username.strip()
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if not raw:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, detail="username cannot be empty")
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if "@" in raw:
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return raw.lower()
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normalized = "".join(ch if (ch.isalnum() or ch in "._-") else "-" for ch in raw.lower()).strip("._-")
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if not normalized:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, detail="username is invalid")
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domain = os.getenv("DEER_FLOW_USERNAME_LOGIN_DOMAIN", "local.deerflow").strip().lower() or "local.deerflow"
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return f"{normalized}@{domain}"
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def _set_session_cookie(response: Response, token: str, request: Request) -> None:
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"""Set the access_token HttpOnly cookie on the response."""
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config = get_auth_config()
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is_https = is_secure_request(request)
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response.set_cookie(
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key="access_token",
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value=token,
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httponly=True,
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secure=is_https,
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samesite="lax",
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max_age=config.token_expiry_days * 24 * 3600 if is_https else None,
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)
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# ── Rate Limiting ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# In-process dict — not shared across workers.
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#
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# **Limitation**: with multi-worker deployments (e.g., gunicorn -w N), each
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# worker maintains its own lockout table, so an attacker effectively gets
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# N × _MAX_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS guesses before being locked out everywhere. For
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# production multi-worker setups, replace this with a shared store (Redis,
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# database-backed counter) to enforce a true per-IP limit.
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_MAX_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS = 5
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_LOCKOUT_SECONDS = 300 # 5 minutes
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# ip → (fail_count, lock_until_timestamp)
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_login_attempts: dict[str, tuple[int, float]] = {}
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def _trusted_proxies() -> list:
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"""Parse ``AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES`` env var into a list of ip_network objects.
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Comma-separated CIDR or single-IP entries. Empty / unset = no proxy is
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trusted (direct mode). Invalid entries are skipped with a logger warning.
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Read live so env-var overrides take effect immediately and tests can
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``monkeypatch.setenv`` without poking a module-level cache.
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"""
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raw = os.getenv("AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES", "").strip()
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if not raw:
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return []
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nets = []
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for entry in raw.split(","):
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entry = entry.strip()
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if not entry:
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continue
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try:
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nets.append(ip_network(entry, strict=False))
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except ValueError:
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logger.warning("AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES: ignoring invalid entry %r", entry)
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return nets
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def _get_client_ip(request: Request) -> str:
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"""Extract the real client IP for rate limiting.
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Trust model:
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- The TCP peer (``request.client.host``) is always the baseline. It is
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whatever the kernel reports as the connecting socket — unforgeable
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by the client itself.
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- ``X-Real-IP`` is **only** honored if the TCP peer is in the
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``AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES`` allowlist (set via env var, comma-separated
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CIDR or single IPs). When set, the gateway is assumed to be behind a
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reverse proxy (nginx, Cloudflare, ALB, …) that overwrites
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``X-Real-IP`` with the original client address.
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- With no ``AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES`` set, ``X-Real-IP`` is silently
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ignored — closing the bypass where any client could rotate the
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header to dodge per-IP rate limits in dev / direct-gateway mode.
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``X-Forwarded-For`` is intentionally NOT used because it is naturally
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client-controlled at the *first* hop and the trust chain is harder to
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audit per-request.
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"""
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peer_host = request.client.host if request.client else None
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trusted = _trusted_proxies()
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if trusted and peer_host:
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try:
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peer_ip = ip_address(peer_host)
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if any(peer_ip in net for net in trusted):
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real_ip = request.headers.get("x-real-ip", "").strip()
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if real_ip:
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return real_ip
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except ValueError:
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# peer_host wasn't a parseable IP (e.g. "unknown") — fall through
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pass
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return peer_host or "unknown"
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def _check_rate_limit(ip: str) -> None:
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"""Raise 429 if the IP is currently locked out."""
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record = _login_attempts.get(ip)
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if record is None:
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return
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fail_count, lock_until = record
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if fail_count >= _MAX_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS:
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if time.time() < lock_until:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=429,
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detail="Too many login attempts. Try again later.",
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)
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del _login_attempts[ip]
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_MAX_TRACKED_IPS = 10000
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def _record_login_failure(ip: str) -> None:
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"""Record a failed login attempt for the given IP."""
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# Evict expired lockouts when dict grows too large
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if len(_login_attempts) >= _MAX_TRACKED_IPS:
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now = time.time()
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expired = [k for k, (c, t) in _login_attempts.items() if c >= _MAX_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS and now >= t]
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for k in expired:
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del _login_attempts[k]
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# If still too large, evict cheapest-to-lose half: below-threshold
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# IPs (lock_until=0.0) sort first, then earliest-expiring lockouts.
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if len(_login_attempts) >= _MAX_TRACKED_IPS:
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by_time = sorted(_login_attempts.items(), key=lambda kv: kv[1][1])
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for k, _ in by_time[: len(by_time) // 2]:
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del _login_attempts[k]
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record = _login_attempts.get(ip)
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if record is None:
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_login_attempts[ip] = (1, 0.0)
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else:
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new_count = record[0] + 1
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lock_until = time.time() + _LOCKOUT_SECONDS if new_count >= _MAX_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS else 0.0
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_login_attempts[ip] = (new_count, lock_until)
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def _record_login_success(ip: str) -> None:
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"""Clear failure counter for the given IP on successful login."""
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_login_attempts.pop(ip, None)
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# ── Endpoints ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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@router.post("/login/local", response_model=LoginResponse)
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async def login_local(
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request: Request,
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response: Response,
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form_data: OAuth2PasswordRequestForm = Depends(),
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):
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"""Local email/password login."""
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client_ip = _get_client_ip(request)
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_check_rate_limit(client_ip)
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user = await get_local_provider().authenticate({"email": form_data.username, "password": form_data.password})
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if user is None:
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_record_login_failure(client_ip)
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail=AuthErrorResponse(code=AuthErrorCode.INVALID_CREDENTIALS, message="Incorrect email or password").model_dump(),
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)
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_record_login_success(client_ip)
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token = create_access_token(str(user.id), token_version=user.token_version)
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_set_session_cookie(response, token, request)
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return LoginResponse(
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expires_in=get_auth_config().token_expiry_days * 24 * 3600,
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needs_setup=user.needs_setup,
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)
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@router.post("/login/username", response_model=UsernameLoginResponse)
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async def login_by_username(request: Request, response: Response, body: UsernameLoginRequest):
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"""Passwordless username login with auto-registration.
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Rules:
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- If mapped account exists, sign in directly (no password required).
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- If account does not exist, create a regular user and sign in.
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Returns the JWT access token in the response body and also sets it as
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a session cookie for browser callers.
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"""
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provider = get_local_provider()
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email = _username_to_email(body.username)
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created = False
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user = await provider.get_user_by_email(email)
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if user is None:
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try:
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user = await provider.create_user(email=email, password=None, system_role="user", needs_setup=False)
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created = True
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logger.info("Auto-registered passwordless user: %s", email)
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except ValueError:
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# Concurrent first login may create the same user in parallel.
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user = await provider.get_user_by_email(email)
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if user is None:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_500_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, detail="Failed to create or load user")
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token = create_access_token(str(user.id), token_version=user.token_version)
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_set_session_cookie(response, token, request)
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return UsernameLoginResponse(
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access_token=token,
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token_type="bearer",
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expires_in=get_auth_config().token_expiry_days * 24 * 3600,
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user_id=str(user.id),
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email=user.email,
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system_role=user.system_role,
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needs_setup=user.needs_setup,
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created=created,
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)
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@router.post("/register", response_model=UserResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)
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async def register(request: Request, response: Response, body: RegisterRequest):
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"""Register a new user account (always 'user' role).
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Admin is auto-created on first boot. This endpoint creates regular users.
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Auto-login by setting the session cookie.
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"""
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try:
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user = await get_local_provider().create_user(email=body.email, password=body.password, system_role="user")
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except ValueError:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
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detail=AuthErrorResponse(code=AuthErrorCode.EMAIL_ALREADY_EXISTS, message="Email already registered").model_dump(),
|
||||
)
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token = create_access_token(str(user.id), token_version=user.token_version)
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_set_session_cookie(response, token, request)
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return UserResponse(id=str(user.id), email=user.email, system_role=user.system_role)
|
||||
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||||
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@router.post("/logout", response_model=MessageResponse)
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async def logout(request: Request, response: Response):
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"""Logout current user by clearing the cookie."""
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response.delete_cookie(key="access_token", secure=is_secure_request(request), samesite="lax")
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return MessageResponse(message="Successfully logged out")
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|
||||
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@router.post("/change-password", response_model=MessageResponse)
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async def change_password(request: Request, response: Response, body: ChangePasswordRequest):
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"""Change password for the currently authenticated user.
|
||||
|
||||
Also handles the first-boot setup flow:
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||||
- If new_email is provided, updates email (checks uniqueness)
|
||||
- If user.needs_setup is True and new_email is given, clears needs_setup
|
||||
- Always increments token_version to invalidate old sessions
|
||||
- Re-issues session cookie with new token_version
|
||||
"""
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.password import hash_password_async, verify_password_async
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||||
|
||||
user = await get_current_user_from_request(request)
|
||||
|
||||
if user.password_hash is None:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, detail=AuthErrorResponse(code=AuthErrorCode.INVALID_CREDENTIALS, message="OAuth users cannot change password").model_dump())
|
||||
|
||||
if not await verify_password_async(body.current_password, user.password_hash):
|
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raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, detail=AuthErrorResponse(code=AuthErrorCode.INVALID_CREDENTIALS, message="Current password is incorrect").model_dump())
|
||||
|
||||
provider = get_local_provider()
|
||||
|
||||
# Update email if provided
|
||||
if body.new_email is not None:
|
||||
existing = await provider.get_user_by_email(body.new_email)
|
||||
if existing and str(existing.id) != str(user.id):
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, detail=AuthErrorResponse(code=AuthErrorCode.EMAIL_ALREADY_EXISTS, message="Email already in use").model_dump())
|
||||
user.email = body.new_email
|
||||
|
||||
# Update password + bump version
|
||||
user.password_hash = await hash_password_async(body.new_password)
|
||||
user.token_version += 1
|
||||
|
||||
# Clear setup flag if this is the setup flow
|
||||
if user.needs_setup and body.new_email is not None:
|
||||
user.needs_setup = False
|
||||
|
||||
await provider.update_user(user)
|
||||
|
||||
# Re-issue cookie with new token_version
|
||||
token = create_access_token(str(user.id), token_version=user.token_version)
|
||||
_set_session_cookie(response, token, request)
|
||||
|
||||
return MessageResponse(message="Password changed successfully")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.get("/me", response_model=UserResponse)
|
||||
async def get_me(request: Request):
|
||||
"""Get current authenticated user info."""
|
||||
user = await get_current_user_from_request(request)
|
||||
return UserResponse(id=str(user.id), email=user.email, system_role=user.system_role, needs_setup=user.needs_setup)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
_SETUP_STATUS_COOLDOWN: dict[str, float] = {}
|
||||
_SETUP_STATUS_COOLDOWN_SECONDS = 60
|
||||
_MAX_TRACKED_SETUP_STATUS_IPS = 10000
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.get("/setup-status")
|
||||
async def setup_status(request: Request):
|
||||
"""Check if an admin account exists. Returns needs_setup=True when no admin exists."""
|
||||
client_ip = _get_client_ip(request)
|
||||
now = time.time()
|
||||
last_check = _SETUP_STATUS_COOLDOWN.get(client_ip, 0)
|
||||
elapsed = now - last_check
|
||||
if elapsed < _SETUP_STATUS_COOLDOWN_SECONDS:
|
||||
retry_after = max(1, int(_SETUP_STATUS_COOLDOWN_SECONDS - elapsed))
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
|
||||
detail="Setup status check is rate limited",
|
||||
headers={"Retry-After": str(retry_after)},
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Evict stale entries when dict grows too large to bound memory usage.
|
||||
if len(_SETUP_STATUS_COOLDOWN) >= _MAX_TRACKED_SETUP_STATUS_IPS:
|
||||
cutoff = now - _SETUP_STATUS_COOLDOWN_SECONDS
|
||||
stale = [k for k, t in _SETUP_STATUS_COOLDOWN.items() if t < cutoff]
|
||||
for k in stale:
|
||||
del _SETUP_STATUS_COOLDOWN[k]
|
||||
# If still too large after evicting expired entries, remove oldest half.
|
||||
if len(_SETUP_STATUS_COOLDOWN) >= _MAX_TRACKED_SETUP_STATUS_IPS:
|
||||
by_time = sorted(_SETUP_STATUS_COOLDOWN.items(), key=lambda kv: kv[1])
|
||||
for k, _ in by_time[: len(by_time) // 2]:
|
||||
del _SETUP_STATUS_COOLDOWN[k]
|
||||
_SETUP_STATUS_COOLDOWN[client_ip] = now
|
||||
admin_count = await get_local_provider().count_admin_users()
|
||||
return {"needs_setup": admin_count == 0}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class InitializeAdminRequest(BaseModel):
|
||||
"""Request model for first-boot admin account creation."""
|
||||
|
||||
email: EmailStr
|
||||
password: str = Field(..., min_length=8)
|
||||
|
||||
_strong_password = field_validator("password")(classmethod(lambda cls, v: _validate_strong_password(v)))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.post("/initialize", response_model=UserResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)
|
||||
async def initialize_admin(request: Request, response: Response, body: InitializeAdminRequest):
|
||||
"""Create the first admin account on initial system setup.
|
||||
|
||||
Only callable when no admin exists. Returns 409 Conflict if an admin
|
||||
already exists.
|
||||
|
||||
On success, the admin account is created with ``needs_setup=False`` and
|
||||
the session cookie is set.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
admin_count = await get_local_provider().count_admin_users()
|
||||
if admin_count > 0:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT,
|
||||
detail=AuthErrorResponse(code=AuthErrorCode.SYSTEM_ALREADY_INITIALIZED, message="System already initialized").model_dump(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
user = await get_local_provider().create_user(email=body.email, password=body.password, system_role="admin", needs_setup=False)
|
||||
except ValueError:
|
||||
# DB unique-constraint race: another concurrent request beat us.
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT,
|
||||
detail=AuthErrorResponse(code=AuthErrorCode.SYSTEM_ALREADY_INITIALIZED, message="System already initialized").model_dump(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
token = create_access_token(str(user.id), token_version=user.token_version)
|
||||
_set_session_cookie(response, token, request)
|
||||
|
||||
return UserResponse(id=str(user.id), email=user.email, system_role=user.system_role)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── OAuth Endpoints (Future/Placeholder) ─────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.get("/oauth/{provider}")
|
||||
async def oauth_login(provider: str):
|
||||
"""Initiate OAuth login flow.
|
||||
|
||||
Redirects to the OAuth provider's authorization URL.
|
||||
Currently a placeholder - requires OAuth provider implementation.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if provider not in ["github", "google"]:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
|
||||
detail=f"Unsupported OAuth provider: {provider}",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=status.HTTP_501_NOT_IMPLEMENTED,
|
||||
detail="OAuth login not yet implemented",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.get("/callback/{provider}")
|
||||
async def oauth_callback(provider: str, code: str, state: str):
|
||||
"""OAuth callback endpoint.
|
||||
|
||||
Handles the OAuth provider's callback after user authorization.
|
||||
Currently a placeholder.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=status.HTTP_501_NOT_IMPLEMENTED,
|
||||
detail="OAuth callback not yet implemented",
|
||||
)
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user