Merge branch 'ji' into master

# Conflicts:
#	offline-backend-20260512/backend/CLAUDE.md
#	offline-backend-20260512/backend/README.md
#	offline-backend-20260512/backend/app/gateway/routers/llmwiki.py
#	offline-backend-20260512/backend/config.yaml
#	offline-backend-20260512/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/config/llmwiki_config.py
#	offline-backend-20260512/backend/tests/test_llmwiki_weknora.py
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吉鑫升 committed 2026-08-26 15:46:58 +08:00
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@@ -1026,10 +1026,14 @@ Both can be modified at runtime via Gateway API endpoints or `DeerFlowClient` me
The embedded detail proxy hides WeKnora's outer `.main > .aside_box` application sidebar and expands the route outlet, but deliberately keeps the Wiki page's internal directory/index sidebar. Do not add an HTML `sandbox` attribute to this trusted, permission-filtered detail iframe: a sandboxed ancestor causes Chromium's built-in Blob PDF viewer to render the browser-blocked page. The Gateway follows upstream redirects only for `/knowledge/{id}/preview` and `/knowledge-bases/{id}/files`, keeping PDF bytes and protected Wiki images inside the signed proxy instead of sending the browser to WeKnora object storage.
Native/private and public Wiki readers must rewrite protected Markdown image
sources to their mapping-scoped DeerFlow `/files?file_path=` endpoints and load
them as Blob URLs. The embedded guard also rewrites protected fetch/XHR values
and hydrates late `img[data-protected-src]` placeholders; never expose the
service token or relax the current-KB authorization to make images work.
sources to their mapping-scoped DeerFlow `/files?file_path=` endpoints and keep
real HTTP URLs on rendered image elements. The embedded guard also rewrites
protected fetch/XHR values and hydrates late `img[data-protected-src]`
placeholders with the signed iframe HTTP proxy URL. Observe both
`data-protected-src` and `src`, because WeKnora may replace the URL after first
paint. Never create/revoke a temporary object URL here: its lightbox reuses the
thumbnail `src` after click. Never expose the service token or relax the
current-KB authorization to make images work.
**Embedded native knowledge-base switching:** The original WeKnora breadcrumb picker remains available inside the detail iframe. A signed 15-minute embed cookie carries only the current DeerFlow user's visible mappings (their own plus published bases); the proxied `/api/v1/knowledge-bases` response is filtered to that allowlist. Choosing another entry performs a full iframe navigation, rechecks the DeerFlow mapping and read/write permission, then reissues the cookie for the selected base. Never expose the upstream service-admin list directly or permit an arbitrary remote knowledge-base ID.
@@ -1511,7 +1515,10 @@ authenticated readers obtain a short-lived signed capability from
`/files/access-url` and load `/api/public/llmwiki/files/{token}`. The signed
payload is restricted to `kind=wiki_file`, mapping id, remote id, validated
protected path, and expiry, and responses provide an inline UTF-8 filename for
new-tab viewing and browser Save As.
new-tab viewing and browser Save As. The proxied WeKnora detail iframe must
likewise leave its scoped HTTP file-proxy URL on every protected image and
restore it if upstream rendering replaces `src`; its click preview reads that
same DOM value, so a fetched-and-revoked object URL is not acceptable.
Third-party pages embed published Wiki content through the chrome-free route
`/#/embed/knowledge/{mapping_id}` (optional exact-page `wikiSlug`). It defaults
@@ -1560,11 +1567,26 @@ Internal search authorization always starts from DeerFlow mapping ids and is
rechecked by the Gateway. External endpoints use the isolated
`/api/external/llmwiki/wiki` namespace and `X-API-Key`; require published +
external-enabled + index-enabled on every request and response, and hard-deny
the `system` / `对话沉淀` mapping. Never return remote WeKnora ids, provenance
refs, credentials, or vector bytes externally. Regression tests:
the `system` / `对话沉淀` mapping. Those API-key endpoints never return remote
WeKnora ids, provenance refs, credentials, or vector bytes.
`POST /api/knowledge/vector-search` is a deliberately separate anonymous API.
It has no token/API-key requirement or rate limit, applies route-scoped
`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`, searches every published local Wiki index
regardless of `external_search_enabled`, and still hard-denies the `system` /
`对话沉淀` mapping before and after search. Its contract is section-level (one
result per matched vector, so Wiki-page fields and URLs may repeat), default
`top_k=10`, with optional `include_page_content`. Unlike the protected legacy
external namespace, this endpoint intentionally returns DeerFlow/WeKnora ids
and raw source/chunk provenance, but never credentials or vector bytes. Wiki
links use `llmwiki.local_wiki_index.frontend_base_url` (development default
`http://127.0.0.1:5174`) and point to the native
`/#/page/workspace/knowledge/{mapping_id}/wiki/view?wikiSlug=...` route.
Regression tests:
`tests/test_llmwiki_local_index_repository.py`,
`tests/test_llmwiki_wiki_sync.py`, `tests/test_llmwiki_vector_search.py`,
`tests/test_external_llmwiki_search.py`, and
`tests/test_external_llmwiki_search.py`,
`tests/test_public_knowledge_vector_search.py`, and
`tests/test_llmwiki_wiki_retrieval.py`.
The sandbox whole-report rewrite may carry an optional `reportOutline` Markdown